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The Economics, Opportunities, and 
Challenges of Health Insurance Exchanges
MARK DUGGAN AND BOB KOCHER
A 
central component of the Af-
fordable Care Act (ACA) is the 
creation of state-based health 
insurance exchanges, which have 
the potential to substantially im-
prove the functioning and expand the reach of 
the private health insurance market. Here, we 
describe salient features of the current mar-
ket for health insurance and explain how the 
exchanges will build on this system by alter-
ing incentives for individuals, employers, and 
insurers. We conclude with a discussion of 
the challenges and key issues that remain. 
the private health insurance market
The U.S. private health insurance market has been dominated by employer-spon-
sored insurance (ESI). In 2009, more than 
90 percent of the 172 million non-elderly 
individuals with private health insurance ob-
tained it through their, or a family member’s, 
employer (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010). The 
dominance of ESI is due to the tax subsidy 
for employer-provided health insurance, the 
benefits of pooling together many individu-
als when negotiating contracts with health 
insurers, and other factors. 
The system, however, works relatively poorly 
for employees of small firms. Small firms are 
much less likely to offer insurance, are likely to 
offer fewer plan options when they do, and must 
pay up to 18 percent more than their larger coun-
terparts for the same policy. While 98 percent of 
firms with 200 or more employees offered ESI to 
their workers in 2009, just 46 percent of firms 
with 3-9 employees did (Kaiser Family Founda-
tion, 2009). As a result, employees of small firms 
(and their dependents) are significantly more 
likely than workers at large firms to lack health 
insurance. The problems are similar for the self-
employed, and even more pronounced for those 
who are not working.
Individuals without ESI coverage can buy 
private health insurance on the individual mar-
ket, though without the tax subsidy ESI enjoys. 
Partly because of the resulting higher (net) 
prices, individual policies tend to be much less 
comprehensive than ESI policies. Addition-
ally, individuals with existing health problems 
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often find it difficult or impossible to obtain 
coverage at affordable rates. Moreover, it is 
difficult for individuals to conduct apples-to-
apples comparisons of the price and quality of 
available plan options. Partly because of this, 
the individual market is thin, insuring just 6 
percent of non-elderly individuals in 2009.
From 1999 to 2009, average ESI premiums 
increased by 70 percent in real terms, while 
median household income (which excludes 
employer contributions for ESI) actually de-
clined by 5 percent. Largely because of this 
contrast, private health insurance coverage 
fell to 65 percent of the non-elderly popu-
lation, versus what had been 74 percent ten 
years earlier.
the exchanges
The ACA will increase health insurance cov-erage beginning in January 2014, through 
two channels: First, Medicaid eligibility will 
be extended to individuals with incomes up to 
133 percent of the federal poverty line (FPL). 
While current income thresholds for Medicaid 
eligibility vary widely across states, this is an 
expansion for almost all states. For example, 
40 states currently have Medicaid eligibility 
thresholds below 133 percent of FPL for low-
income parents, with the median state having a 
threshold of 64 percent and the lowest (Arkan-
sas), just 17 percent. Eligibility standards are 
even tighter for childless adults, with just six 
states providing any Medicaid coverage for this 
group (KFF, 2009).
Second, the creation of state-based health 
insurance exchanges will allow individuals to 
select from qualified health plans operating in 
their area of residence. By 2019, the new rules 
will raise Medicaid enrollment by 16 million, 
and the exchanges will cover an additional 24 
million people. When these changes are com-
bined with an expected eight-million-person 
decline in the number of people with other 
sources of private coverage, the ACA will re-
duce the number of uninsured people by a to-
tal of 32 million (CBO, 2010).
Individuals without an affordable ESI of-
fer will be able to acquire coverage through 
the exchanges, with subsidies that decline 
with income available for households with 
incomes between 133 percent and 400 per-
cent of FPL. The subsidies are structured so 
that individuals with higher incomes receive 
smaller subsidies. (For example, a family of 
four with a 2014 income of $45,000 receives 
a subsidy of $9,500 to purchase a $12,100 
family policy, while a similar family with 
income of $90,000 would receive approxi-
mately $3,600.) Additionally, firms with up to 
100 workers will be able to acquire coverage 
for their workers through the exchanges, al-
though their workers would not be eligible for 
the premium subsidies.
The ACA requires states to set up exchang-
es by January 2014, but gives them consider-
able latitude as to structure. A state can set 
up one exchange that serves both individuals 
and small employers, or segment these mar-
kets with separate exchanges. Similarly, states 
can join together to form regional exchanges, 
which are likely to be relatively attractive to 
states with low populations, in order to sta-
bilize risk pools and premium fluctuations. 
Perhaps most noteworthy, beginning in 2017, 
states can allow firms with more than 100 
workers to acquire coverage for their workers 
through the exchanges.
key functions of the exchanges
In practice, state exchanges will have five primary functions:
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1. Determine which plans can be offered
2. Assist consumers in choosing between 
plans based on price and quality
3. Determine subsidies for which individuals 
are eligible, and calculate net premiums
4. Minimize incentives for plans to preferen-
tially target particular segments of individu-
als and employers
5. Perform risk-adjustments to mitigate plans’ 
cherry-picking profitable consumers
How exchanges operationalize these func-
tions will largely determine how successfully 
the exchange market functions. Implement-
ing each function will require skillful trade-
offs. For example, effective competition and 
shopping can be achieved by having several 
plan options without overwhelming consum-
ers with choice. Today, most individuals and 
small groups do not have sufficient choice to 
enable effective shopping. On the opposite ex-
treme, many workers in the Federal Employee 
Health Program have too many choices, lead-
ing to the majority of workers’ aggregating 
to a single plan, and resulting in ineffective 
competition since the FEHBP program does 
not give consumers adequate information to 
clarify the trade-offs across plans.
If exchanges commoditize plan-offering to 
enable simple price-comparison shopping for 
consumers, the result could be exchanges pre-
cluding plans from offering innovative benefit 
designs—such as narrow provider networks, 
and large incentives for preventive care—that 
are important approaches for constraining 
premium growth. When it comes to subsidy- 
determination, the frequency with which 
income data are updated (e.g., quarterly, 
annually) will affect the inevitable shifting of 
people between Medicaid and the exchange, 
and will affect future tax obligations for those 
whose incomes increase (and thus, whose 
subsidies decrease) mid-year. 
Additionally, there is the question of 
how effectively exchanges reduce distor-
tions resulting from premiums that are con-
strained by rating rules that limit variation to 
3:1 based on age, with adjustments only for 
smoking status. The level of effectiveness here 
will be critical in assuring competition across 
the entirety of the exchange. Certain groups, 
such as young people who smoke, could be 
disproportionately profitable, since they will 
have high premiums relative to their expect-
ed costs. In contrast, older non-smokers may 
have artificially low premiums and could be 
unprofitable. Additionally, exchanges will 
have to risk-adjust plan payments, so that 
plans attracting a disproportionate share of 
sicker patients will not be penalized. Howev-
er, the federal government’s recent experience 
with payments to Medicare Advantage plans 
suggests that this will be very difficult.
economic benefits of the exchanges
Effective exchanges will bring millions of people into the market for private health 
insurance through the mandate and the slid-
ing-scale subsidies. For small businesses, one 
major benefit of exchanges could be disinter-
mediating brokers and their commissions—
which can equal as much as 10% of the premi-
um. Moreover, small businesses gain far greater 
premium stability by being a part of a larger 
risk pool with the new rating rules. 
Also, the exchanges will provide a pow-
erful incentive for insurers to price competi-
tively, since individuals will bear the full cost 
on the margin of more generous plans. In 
contrast, workers who purchase insurance 
through employers today are shielded from 
the full marginal cost, partly because of the tax 
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exclusion. In response, plans are likely to in-
novate in ways that reduce premium growth 
by increasing the productivity of their provid-
er networks and the effectiveness of medical-
management programs—not just by trying to 
drive unit prices down.
potential weaknesses of the exchanges
To deliver the consumer and economic ben-efits of exchanges, operators must over-
come two potential policy shortcomings: First, 
setting exchanges at the level of the State was 
largely a political choice, not an economic one. 
While this choice allows States flexibility to 
tailor plan choices to the needs of their resi-
dents—perhaps fostering new entrants, and 
allowing local plans to participate—it makes 
it far harder to achieve scale and consistency 
for key functions. Moreover, it significantly 
complicates preparations for the 2014 launch. 
(Simply getting IT systems for subsidy deter-
mination and Medicaid eligibility to work in 
each state will be a major accomplishment, let 
alone constructing a risk-adjustment algorithm 
and determining how many plans are eligible.) 
Since many states have small populations, risk 
pools will be less stable there, leading to greater 
premium volatility and, if premiums rise more 
than anticipated, greater subsidy cost. 
A second major potential weakness of the 
ACA is that it requires separate individual and 
small-employer exchanges—which amplifies 
the volatility of small risk pools and leads to 
potentially higher premiums. If premiums rise, 
the problem could spiral, as employers with 
younger and healthier workforces forgo ex-
changes, since they are able to obtain cheaper 
insurance elsewhere. 
The individual market outside of ex-
changes is likely to wither over time, since in-
dividual subsidies can only be accessed in the 
exchange. In contrast, the small-group market 
could persist for a long time. Bifurcated mar-
kets will make avoiding adverse selection in 
exchanges difficult. This was the unfortunate 
outcome for most prior exchanges targeting 
businesses—most recently, the exchange run 
by the Pacific Business Group on Health. Also, 
more employers may drop coverage, since 
purchasing as an employer brings no benefits 
to a worker who can buy cheaper subsidized 
insurance on the individual exchange. This is 
particularly true for small firms that incur no 
penalty if they drop coverage. If this scenario 
becomes reality, or if the individual exchange 
proves to be a lower-cost and more efficient 
market, then the problem of employers’ drop-
ping coverage could be much worse than the 
CBO forecast predicts. 
key issues/challenges for the exchanges
The exchanges must overcome two major near-term challenges: First, the consum-
er experience has to work well, if the ACA is 
to fulfill its intention of bringing in millions 
of uninsured (and particularly, young and 
healthy) individuals. Subsidies must be ac-
curate. Real-time shopping experiences must 
be intuitive and quick. Interactions should be 
personalized over time by medical statuses and 
preferences. Many private-sector firms, but few 
in the public sector (think of state Medicaid of-
fices or DMVs), have shown they can deliver 
such experiences. Yet poor service could lead 
to low uptake and adverse selection. Here, 
well-designed sites like healthcare.gov offer 
glimmers of hope, and much can be learned 
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from examples such as the Part D plan-finder 
and the Massachusetts Connector.
Second, risk-adjustment and product stan-
dards need to ensure that individuals in all seg-
ments of the market receive attractive insurance 
options. It would be unfortunate if exchanges 
were to give plans an incentive to target prof-
itable young smokers at the expense of older 
and sicker individuals. The tools of branding, 
marketing, and product design give plans a 
big advantage over current risk-adjustment ap-
proaches. There is little time to develop better 
approaches and the ACA only calls for prospec-
tive—not retrospective—risk adjustment. A 
vibrant market develops across all segments in 
the exchange only if each offers profit potential. 
To achieve this, exchanges will have to get risk-
adjustment to work as effectively as possible, 
and achieve the proper balance between inno-
vative benefit-designs and standardized plans. 
conclusion
How well exchanges operationalize their five key functions and how effectively they 
overcome these challenges will likely determine 
whether Americans perceive the ACA as ben-
eficial, and what will be the long-term role for 
exchanges as a public-policy solution. If ex-
changes execute their primary functions skill-
fully and arrive at effective solutions to these 
challenges, the benefits to consumers and em-
ployers will be substantial: Exchanges could 
serve as a catalyst that drives down premium 
growth, as plans seek to attract larger shares 
of increasingly value-conscious consumers. 
Moreover, by reducing distribution costs and 
shifting the basis of competition from under-
writing to medical value, exchanges could be 
an instigator of significant productivity among 
plans and the health care sector. 
Time will tell if exchanges live up to their 
promise. To do so will require exceptional 
leadership at the state level, timely federal 
policy, sufficient funding, and enough politi-
cal inoculation to make the economic tradeoffs 
that are necessary. 
Letters commenting on this piece or others may 
be submitted at submit.cgi?context=ev.
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